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Case No. 20170302-CA

IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee/Plaintiff,
V.

ADAM HILLMAN,

Appellant/Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
~

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Hillman, the Defendant, was convicted by a jury of three misdemeanor crimes.
At the beginning of the jury trial, the State orally moved in limine for an order precluding
~

the parties from eliciting testimony or asking questions about Mr. Hillman being mentally
ill unless it was first shown that such a mental illness was relevant to the mens rea.
Defense counsel opposed the motion, asking to refer to Mr. Hillman as "mentally ill" in

~

the defense opening statement and asking to be allowed to ask a police officer witness
whether Mr. Hillman seemed to be suffering from a mental health episode. After
argument, the judge ordered that the parties could elicit testimony about Mr. Hillman's
relevant conduct, but precluded the parties from asking questions or eliciting testimony
'4iJ

about whether Mr. Hillman was mentally ill unless a witness had personal or professional

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

knowledge of a diagnosed mental illness. Mr. Hillman now argues that the district court
judge's ruling on that motion in limine was erroneous.
The district court's ruling should be affirmed by this Court because that ruling was
legally correct. There was no proffer that the officer or any other testifying witness had
personal knowledge of Mr. Hillman' s mental health status, and no expert testimony about
a mental health diagnosis was proffered. Additionally, that ruling should be affirmed
because Mr. Hillman did not preserve the issue for appellate review.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue: Whether the district court judge erred in precluding the parties from asking nonexpert police officers to opine about whether Mr. Hillman was suffering from a mental
illness when they encountered him.

Standard of appellate review: "Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a
question of law, we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence
for an abuse of discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 18, 76 P.3d 1165, 1167.

Preservation: The Appellant has not preserved the issue for appellate review because Mr.
(iw

Hillman did not proffer any admissible evidence or state any legal authority to sufficiently
allow the district court to review the issue that is now before this Court.

2
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Wi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural History of the Case and
Disposition of the Case in District Court
The Defendant was charged on August 25, 2016 in Third District Court case
161908929 with three misdemeanor counts: Class A propelling bodily substance (UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 76-5-102.9(3), Class B interfering with arresting officer {UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-8-305), Class B failure to disclose identity {UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301.5). R. 16. Those crimes were alleged to have been committed on August 16, 2016. Id. The
Information was amended on October 18, 2016 to add a class B trespass charge, but that
additional charge was dismissed on motion of the State before the jury trial began. R. 3739, 41-43, 141-143. The Defendant was convicted by a jury on January 11, 2017 of all
Gj

three remaining counts. R. 141-143, 478. The Defendant was sentenced on March 3,
2017. R. 151-153. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 31, 2017. R.
169-170.
Facts of the Case
On the morning of the jury trial in this case, counsel for the State made an oral
motion in limine asking the district court for an order that "neither party elicit testimony
or ask questions about the defendant's mental illness absent a showing first that any
mental illness he may have has a bearing on his intent on the mens rea element to the
crime." R. 191. Defense counsel agreed not to ask any witness for a specific diagnosis,
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but objected to the State's request for a prohibition on eliciting testimony about mental
illness. Id.
Defense counsel argued that the jury is "entitled to know exactly what was going
on" and that counsel should be able to "paint the complete picture of what was going on
that day." Id. Counsel for the State clarified that he was not asking to exclude any
questioning about Mr. Hillman's specific behaviors on the day in question, but was asking
to exclude questions about whether Mr. Hillman "seemed mentally ill." R. 192. Defense
counsel responded that they had "a right to humanize" Mr. Hillman. Id. They argued that
their "client does suffer from mental illness. This whole episode resulted from a mental
health episode." Id. Defense counsel asked to be permitted to mention briefly during the
opening statement that Mr. Hillman "does suffer from mental illness," and to be permitted
to ask the testifying police officer "based on his training and experience working with
mentally ill populations, if he believed that [Mr. Hillman] was suffering from a mental
health episode at the time that he encountered him." Id.
Counsel for the State argued that both the mention of mental illness in the opening
and asking the officer about mental health would be inappropriate because the State
would not be calling any mental health professionals and therefore none of the State's
witnesses were qualified to opine about mental health. R. 192-193. Defense counsel
responded that the State would be showing a video of the incident in question, and that
upon viewing that video "it's obvious that he's mentally ill. Common sense tells you that
he is having a mental health episode." R. 193.
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~

Neither party proffered or identified testimony or evidence that would be offered
~

to show that Mr. Hillman had a mental health diagnosis. R. 191-194. The judge ruled that
Mr. Hillman or a health care provider could testify about Mr. Hillman' s mental health, but
that a police officer would not be permitted to do so due to lack of training. R. 193-194.
The judge also ruled that during the opening statement, defense counsel could describe
Mr. Hillman's conduct, but could not state that Mr. Hillman was mentally ill during that
opening statement unless there would subsequently be testimony about a mental health
diagnosis during the trial. R. 194.

~

The State called four witnesses during the trial: two security guards, and two
police officers. R. 336-338, 368-369, 388-389, 420-421. The Defendant did not testify
and did not call any witnesses. R. 428-429.

"

During the trial, the two security guards testified that on August 16, 2016, Adam
Hillman (the Defendant) was at the Road Home, a homeless shelter in Salt Lake County.
R. 338-339, 369. Mr. Hillman repeatedly refused the requests of a staff person and the
two security guards that he put a shirt on. R. 338-341, 369-371. Mr. Hillman then started
acting aggressive and "peculiar," motioning and dancing in an "odd" way. R. 341-342.
He was verbally aggressive, was showing signs of physical aggression, was getting in the
guards' faces, and was making erratic movements. R. 3 71. Mr. Hillman said "no" when
the guards told him to leave. R. 342. Mr. Hillman identified himself as something like
"Snakehead I 028." R. 346, 352. Mr. Hillman "did not seem to be himself. He was very
disoriented, very confused." R. 34 7. Mr. Hillman was "very belligerent, very wild, very
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sporadic." R. 352. He threw his hands up and said that he was "okay fighting [the
guards] and was not afraid of [them]." Id. While one of the guards was on the phone
with police dispatch, Mr. Hillman walked up to that guard, spat a substantial amount of
saliva into that guard's face, spat in the direction of the other guard, and then left the

~

building. R. 346-348, 371-372. The jury listened to audio of the guard's phone
conversation with police dispatch, and watched surveillance video of Mr. Hillman' s
interactions with the guards in the shelter. R. 344-345, 350-351. That guard knew that
some people in the shelter were on medication, but did not know whether Mr. Hillman
was using any medication. R. 356-358, 366.
Officer Wilkes testified that he had been dispatched to investigate the security
guard's call, and he made contact with Mr. Hillman soon after Mr. Hillman left the Road
Home. R. 389-391. The officer was wearing a police uniform and driving a marked
police car. R. 391-392. The officer ordered Mr. Hillman to stop, but Mr. Hillman tried to
go around the officer, tried to bite the officer, and repeatedly tried to pull away after the
officer grabbed his arm. R. 392-393. Mr. Hillman threatened to "bring a ton of pain
down on" the officer. R. 393. After being handcuffed, Mr. Hillman repeatedly refused to
give his name, saying "1028 Snakehead," and also saying "no" when told to give his
name. R. 394-395. Mr. Hillman spat multiple times on the back window of the officer's
car, saying, "How do you like that?" R. 395-396. During the officer's interaction with
Mr. Hillman, Mr. Hillman was aggressive and acting strangely. R. 406-407. The jury
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tL

watched video from a body-worn camera of part of the officer's interaction with Mr.
Cj

Hillman. R. 398-399.
At the end of Officer Wilkes's testimony, counsel for the State considered asking
the officer about his on-the-job expertise regarding mental health, and asking the officer
about whether it seemed to him that Mr. Hillman was having a mental health episode. R.
415-416. Before doing so, counsel for the parties approached the bench and counsel for
the State asked the judge whether that line of questioning would be precluded by the
judge's previous ruling on the motion in limine. Id. The judge said those questions

4.1

would be precluded by the previous ruling, and counsel for the State did not ask those
questions. Id.
Officer Fox then testified that he had arrived after Officer Wilkes had handcuffed
Mr. Hillman. R. 423-425. He saw Mr. Hillman spit on the other officer's car. R. 425.
Mr. Hillman was not acting normally. R. 427-428.
The parties stipulated to the jury instructions that were submitted to the jury. R.
472-473. Neither party proffered a jury instruction specifically addressing mental illness.

<i6

See R. 97-102, 107-114. During closing arguments, both parties extensively argued the

issue of mens rea. R. 441-451, R. 455-458. Both parties also argued in closing about Mr.
Hillman's odd behaviors and lucidity and the bearing of those issues on mens rea. R. 451,
455,462. The jury found Mr. Hillman guilty of all three counts. R. 478.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the district court's ruling on the State's motion in limine
because the ruling was correct and was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. The
officer's non-expert opinion about whether Mr. Hillman was having a mental health
episode was irrelevant because his unqualified opinion would not make it more or less
probable that Mr. Hillman was able to fonn the requisite mental state. Even if relevant,
the officer was not permitted to testify about Mr. Hillman's mental health status because
the officer did not have personal knowledge about that mental health status, as required
by Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Evidence about mental health diagnoses
should only be presented by witnesses with personal knowledge of previous diagnosis, or
by an expert qualified to diagnose. Neither party suggested that the officer was qualified
to testify as an expert as required by Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
evidence was also inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because it
would have served only to confuse or mislead the jury about the value of a statement by
the officer about Mr. Hillman's mental health.
The Defendant did not preserve the issue now before this Court. When arguing the
motion in limine before the district court judge, defense counsel did not proffer or
identify evidence or testimony that would show that the defendant was mentally ill.
Defense counsel did not explain why the State's witnesses were qualified to testify about
that issue. Defense counsel did not identify a legal right that would entitle the defendant
to have one of the State's witnesses opine about whether Mr. Hillman was mentally ill.
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~

Defense counsel did not cite or refer to any rules, statutes, or Constitutional provisions, or
case law while arguing this issue before the district court judge. The district court
therefore did not have a reasonable opportunity to consider the arguments being made by
Mr. Hillman for the first time on appeal.
The district court did not abuse its discretion because its ruling was reasonable.
Even if the district court erred, this Court should not reverse the convictions because a
constitutional right was not implicated and Mr. Hillman has not shown that a different
ruling would likely have changed the outcome of the trial. Even if the district court erred
and a constitutional right was implicated, Mr. Hillman is required to show plain error
because the issue was unpreserved, and Mr. Hillman has not shown plain error. And even
if the district court erred, a constitutional issue was implicated, and the issue was
preserved, this Court should not reverse the convictions because the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING WAS CORRECT UNDER THE UT AH
RULES OF EVIDENCE

A. The proffered evidence of alleged mental illness was not relevant.
"Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." U.R.Evid. 402. "Evidence is relevant if it
has any tendency to make a [consequential] fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." U.R.Evid. 401. The Defendant's mental state when committing
the crimes in this case was a consequential fact, so his mental state was relevant. The
9
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district court has "broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including lay witness
testimony, and [the appellate courts] will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion."
State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 1 31, 322 P .3d 624, 633.
The members of the jury heard quite a bit of evidence about Mr. Hillman's mental
state. They heard detailed descriptions from four witnesses about his conduct during the
crimes. R. 338-352, 369-372, 389-396, 406-407, 423-428. They heard testimony from
those witnesses specifically about Mr. Hillman's demeanor and affect, and about whether
he was acting normally. R. 341-342, 347,352,371, 406-407, 427-428. Defense counsel
argued that "with the video the state will be showing, it's obvious that he is mentally ill."
R. 193. And the jury saw those videos of Mr. Hillman's conduct. R. 350-351, 398-399.
The judge took no action to limit the admission of that evidence.
The judge placed only one limitation on evidence about Mr. Hillman's mental
state: the parties were precluded from asking witnesses (other than Mr. Hillman) without
specific mental health expertise whether Mr. Hillman was mentally ill and whether he
was suffering from a mental health episode when they encountered him. R. 192: 19-24,
193:14-194:1, 194:16-19; see also R. 415:16-416:4. The State never "backpedaled on its
initial motion in limine" (Br. Applt. I 0). Instead, counsel for the State suspected that a
particular line of questioning would still be precluded by the judge's ruling, so instead of
just asking the question, counsel for the State asked to have the parties approach the
bench. R. 415: 12-20. The judge said the State's proposed question would still be
precluded by the previous ruling. R. 415 :22-416: 1. Counsel for the State did not ask the
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judge to revoke the previous ruling, did not propose narrowing the previous ruling, and
did not argue that its proposed question would not actually be precluded by the ruling. R.
416:2-5. Instead, once the judge answered the question, the conversation ended. Id.
Contrary to the argument in the Appellant's Brief at page 11, the judge never
precluded either party from arguing in closing that Mr. Hillman "was suffering from a
mental health episode," or from "explaining that reasonable doubt existed as to whether
Mr. Hillman had the required mental state." The judge made no orders limiting closing
arguments. The judge never precluded either party from "explaining why Mr. Hillman
identified himself as '1028 Snakehead,"' or from presenting evidence to show that Mr.
Hillman believed his name was 1028 Snakehead. The State's witnesses did not know
why Mr. Hillman referred to himself as such (see e.g. R. 400:5-7), but the judge did
nothing to limit Mr. Hillman's ability to present witnesses, other evidence, or an
explanation about the significance of that phrase, and did not prevent defense counsel
from making an argument in closing based on the evidence that was presented. And
contrary to the statement on Appellant's Brief at p. 10, the district court judge did not
GI

limit the evidence or closing statements by ordering that the Defense could describe
conduct 'and then let the jury make their own detennination with regard' to mental illness
(quoting R. 194). That limitation was explicitly specific to the defense's opening
statement. The discussion resulting in that limitation occurred after discussion about the
limit on evidence had concluded, and the parties were specifically only discussing what
could be said during the opening statement. R. 194:2-22.
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The judge's order precluding the parties from asking the State's witnesses about
whether Mr. Hillman was mentally ill or suffering a mental health episode was correct
because those witnesses had no relevant evidence to present about that issue. None of the
witnesses knew Mr. Hillman. None of them even knew his name until an officer found

~

Mr. Hillman's ID in his pocket at the end of their encounter. R. 346:12-16, 394:20-24,
396:18-25. None of them knew whether he had been diagnosed with a mental illness.
futl

None of them knew whether he sometimes acted in the way they witnessed, or whether he
usually acted differently. None of them knew whether there was some other cause for his
behavior.
Because none of the State's witnesses knew those things, any speculation or
opinion by those witnesses about Mr. Hillman's mental health would not make it more or
less probable that he had the requisite mental state for each offense. While counsel for
the State had also asked the judge to preclude questions about whether Mr. Hillman
"seemed not all there, questions along those lines" (R. 192:5-7), the judge did not grant

~

that portion of the State's request and the parties asked the witnesses similar questions
and received answers (see e.g. R. 347, 352, 427-428). Therefore, the only precluded
question sought irrelevant evidence.
In the Jaeger case discussed on pages 8-9 of the Appellate's Brief, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the district court in that case erred by excluding the victim's
mental health records, but held that the error was harmless. State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,

,r,r 32-38, 973 P.2d 404.

Those records were held to be relevant because they discussed a
12
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~

previous suicide attempt by the victim, and the central issue in the trial was whether the
victim was murdered by the defendant or whether she committed suicide. Id. at ,r,r 15-16.
In the case now before this Court, competent evidence showing that Mr. Hillman had
been diagnosed with a mental illness would have been relevant, and would not have been
precluded by the district court's order. Evidence showing Mr. Hillman's state of mind,
which is the category most comparable to the records at issue in Jaeger, was relevant and
~

was admitted through the testimony about Mr. Hillman's behavior. The precluded
questioning, about whether an officer or another unqualified witness thought Mr. Hillman
seemed mentally ill that day, was not relevant. The precluded questioning is more akin to
asking a inexperienced passerby in Jaeger whether the victim in that case seemed
suicidal, and would have been irrelevant in that case as well. The judge's ruling in this
case was correct and did not abuse the district court's discretion.

B. The proffered evidence of alleged mental illness was inadmissible under
Rules 403, 602, 701, and 702.
"A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." U.R.Evid. 602.
No evidence was proffered to the district court to suggest any of the State's witnesses had
personal knowledge about whether Mr. Hillman had a mental illness or was having a
mental health episode. R. 191-194. The only information the witnesses had about Mr.
Hillman's mental state was his demeanor and the actions they saw him take. They
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testified about both of those things, and the jury also viewed video of Mr. Hillman' s
demeanor and actions during the time in question. Because the witnesses did not have
any additional personal knowledge, the district court judge was correct in precluding
those witnesses from answering questions that went beyond their personal knowledge.

"If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is
limited to one that ... is not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge." U.R.Evid. 701. "[A] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." U.R.Evid. 702.
A mental illness is "a mental disease or defect that substantially impairs a person's
mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be a congenital
condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or mental disease and
includes, but is not limited to, intellectual disability." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2305(4)(b)(i).1 "'Mental illness' does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by
repeated criminal conduct." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-2-305(4)(b)(ii). Mental health is a
legally regulated area of scientific study and expertise. Who may and may not diagnose a
mental illness is legally regulated. See e.g. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 58-60-204(2)-(4) and

While the criminal code defines mental illness, neither party requested an instruction
about mental illness, so the issue of whether the jury should have been given such an
instruction is unpreserved. And where there was no testimony or evidence that Mr.
Hillman has been diagnosed or can be diagnosed with a mental illness, it was appropriate
1
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58-60-205 (distinguishing between the requirements for licensure for three different
categories of social workers, and precluding one of those categories from diagnosing
mental illness).
The diagnosis of mental illness requires scientific and technical knowledge, and
therefore testimony stating an opinion· about whether someone has a mental illness based
on observed behavior must be expert testimony. Police officers have substantial
experience with people suffering from abnormalities manifested primarily by repeated
criminal conduct. But such an abnormality is not a mental illness, and police officers do
not have the required expertise to diagnose a mental illness, especially in someone with
whom they have only brief contact. While police officers interact with mentally ill
people, and while some officers have training on how to interact with mentally ill people,
Gtj

police officers do not have special expertise in diagnosing mental illness.
The basis for Mr. Hillman's objection to the State's motion in limine was that
defense counsel wanted to ask the opinion of one or both police officers about whether
Mr. Hillman was having a mental health episode when he spoke with them. R. 192:1924. Because an opinion about whether he was mentally ill or was having a mental health
episode would be "based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," Rule
70 I would prohibit the non-expert police officers in this case from stating such an
opinion. None of the State's witnesses could be qualified as experts about mental health

~

for the parties to not request, and for the district court to not provide, sua sponte, such an
instruction.
15
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under Rule 702. The judge was therefore correct in ruling that the parties could only ask
such questions of qualified healthcare providers, and did not abuse his discretion.
"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence." U.R.Evid. 403. The very limited value of the possibility that an
(iJ

unqualified witness might think Mr. Hillman seemed mentally ill was substantially
outweighed in this case by a danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
Asking a uniformed police officer about his experience with mentally ill people, and then
asking whether Mr. Hillman seemed mentally ill to him, presents a very substantial risk
that the members of the jury would consider the officer to be a reliable source for that
information, when, for the reasons discussed above, he is not. The district court judge
therefore did not abuse his discretion by precluding those questions.

C. The district court's ruling did not deprive Mr. Hillman of a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.
"[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense. And that right is abridged by evidentiary rulings that infringe
upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve." State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, ,I 55, 335
~

P.3d 900, 911 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Weighty interests include:
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evidence about the circumstances of a murder confession when that confession is the only
iid}

link between the defendant and the crime (Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986));
evidence that another person committed a murder and the police framed the defendant

~

(Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,331 (2006)); and witnesses and evidence that a
third party committed the murder that the defendant was on trial for (McCullar, 2014 UT
App 215). The possibility of a statement that Mr. Hillman may have seemed mentally ill
that day, when the witness is unqualified to state such an opinion, is not a weighty
interest.
The district court judge's evidentiary rulings were also not disproportionate to the
purposes they were designed to serve. Each of the Rules of Evidence discussed above
that support the judge's ruling in this case served exactly their intended appropriate
purposes: to narrowly exclude evidence with no probative value because the witness who
allegedly would have offered that evidence did not have the personal knowledge or
qualifications to express such an opinion. The district court judge did not violate Mr.
Hillman's rights by precluding that line of questioning, and this Court should affirm the

@

district court judge's ruling.

II.

THE APPELLANT DID NOT PRESERVE THE ISSUE
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on

appeal. The issue must be raised to a level of consciousness that allows the trial court an
adequate opportunity to address it. The preservation rule applies to every claim,
17
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including constitutional questions." State v. Davie, 2011 UT App 380,115,264 P.3d
770, 774 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "The preservation rule precludes
review of any unpreserved claim unless a defendant can demonstrate that exceptional
circumstances exist or plain error occurred." State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, 115, 321
P.3d 1136 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate courts "look to
three factors to determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: (1) whether the
issue was raised in a timely fashion, (2) whether it was raised specifically, (3) and
whether the party introduced supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." State v.

Bird, 2015 UT 7,110,345 P.3d 1141 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
In this case, defense counsel timely raised the issue, and specifically raised the
issue. R. 191-194, 192: 19-24. However, defense counsel did not introduce supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority. "The general invocation of a theory is insufficient.
... Preservation requires affording the district court a meaningful opportunity to rule on
the ground that is advanced on appeal, and that implies, at a minimum, not just the
invocation of a legal principle but also its application to the facts of the case." State v.

Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, ,I 10, 67 P.3d 1005, 1007-08 (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, the issue was not preserved and this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling.
While arguing the State's motion in limine, counsel for the State requested an
order that "neither party elicit testimony or ask questions about the defendant's [alleged]
mental illness" unless there was first a showing that any such mental illness was relevant
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~

to Mr. Hillman's mens rea in this case. R. 191:10-15. The defense objected to that
4:1

motion, arguing that evidence of the mental illness ')ust paints a whole picture as to what
occurred" and that "the jury is entitled to know what was going on." R. 191 :20-25.
Counsel for the State then clarified that he was not asking to preclude questions about Mr.
Hillman's behavior, but only questions about whether Mr. Hillman seemed mentally ill.
R. 192:1-7, 192:9-10. Defense counsel then asserted a "right to humanize" Mr. Hillman.

~

The jury is not entitled to a "whole picture" about what occurred. For example, the
jury was not entitled to know Mr. Hillman's criminal history. See e.g. U.R.Evid. 404,

'4j

609. The jury was not entitled to see video of a spit hood being placed on Mr. Hillman by
the officers, or to hear that the officers were going to place a spit hood on him. R. 195200. Mr. Hillman also does not have a right to be humanized. Instead, Mr. Hillman is
entitled to have admissible evidence presented to the jury. Defense counsel mentioned no
legal authority to show that the precluded evidence was admissible.
While the motion was being argued, defense counsel also did not proffer
supporting evidence. While there was discussion about Mr. Hillman' s behavior that

@

would be shown through testimony and videos, defense counsel did not identify any
evidence that would support their request to have an officer opine about Mr. Hillman's
mental health. Counsel did not suggest that Mr. Hillman had been diagnosed or what that
diagnosis was, and counsel did not proffer any information about either officer's specific
training or experience with diagnosing mental illness.

19
~
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While the appellant objected to and argued the specific issue ruled on by the
district court, he did not provide any meaningful evidentiary or legal support for his
argument. Because the appellant did not provide the district court judge with a
meaningful opportunity to review their arguments, this Court should affirm the district
court's ruling.

III.

IF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS ERRONEOUS, THE ERROR
WAS HARMLESS
"A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its

determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. A
trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ,I
20, 989 P.2d 52, 58. As discussed above in this brief, the district court's ruling on the
State's motion in limine was correct, and the district court was within its broad discretion
in making the decision it did. The decision was reasonable under the circumstances and
based on the arguments made when the State's motion was argued.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to have a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense. Holmes, 547 U.S. 319 at 321. A defendant's
constitutional rights are not violated when irrelevant evidence is excluded. State v.

Manwaring, 2011 UT App 443, ,I 41, 268 P.3d 201. A defendant's constitutional rights
are also not violated when courts "exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally
relevant, or poses an undue risk of ... confusion of the issues." Holmes at 326-327
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
20
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"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Miranda, 2017 UT App
203, iJ 32 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987)). For an error that
does not violate a constitutional right, "the burden is on [the d]efendant to show that the
court's ruling led to a likelihood of prejudice." State v. Bergeson, 2013 UT App 257, ,r 9,
314 P.3d 1061, 1064 (quoting State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, iJ 48, 20 P.3d 271).
Gb

"[U]npreserved federal constitutional claims are not subject to a heightened review
standard but are to be reviewed under the plain error doctrine." State v. Bond, 2015 UT

@

88, ,r 44,361 P.3d 104, 118. When an error violates a defendant's constitutional rights
and the issue is properly preserved, "before [that] error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at ,r
37 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
Even if the district court erred in this case by excluding evidence that was
irrelevant, repetitive, only marginally relevant, or that posed an undue risk of confusion of
the issues, such an error would not violate Mr. Hillman' s constitutional rights. This brief

@

argues above in sections I.A. and LB. that the precluded evidence was irrelevant or at best
only marginally relevant, that it was repetitive of the evidence about the victim's behavior
and demeanor, and that it would have confused the issues. Because a constitutional right
is not implicated, the district court's ruling, even if erroneous, should only be reversed if
Mr. Hillman shows that the error would likely have changed the outcome of the trial. Mr.
Hillman has not shown that the jury hearing a police officer's non-expert opinion about

21
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whether Mr. Hillman was suffering from a mental health episode would have changed the
jury's verdict when the jury had already heard testimony about Mr. Hillman's behavior
and demeanor and seen video of them same.
Even if the precluded evidence was meaningfully relevant and was erroneously
excluded, the issue, as discussed above in section II of this brief, was not preserved. In
that situation, Mr. Hillman is required to show that the district court's ruling was plain
error, and he has not made that showing.
Even if the precluded evidence was meaningfully relevant and erroneously
excluded and the issue was properly preserved, this Court should still not reverse Mr.
Hillman' s conviction because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
members of the jury heard plenty of evidence to support a finding that Mr. Hillman's
ability to form the required mental state for each charge was not clouded by a mental
illness. They heard that not only did he provide a non-name phrase when the officer
asked for his name, but that he also refused to provide his name and did not claim that the
non-name phrase was his name. R. 394-395; see also R. 448-449, 462. They heard
testimony from the guards that based on the positioning of Mr. Hillman's body and
mouth, the quantity of saliva, and other factors, that he spat on them intentionally. R.
346-347, 354-355, 372. They heard from the officers that when Mr. Hillman was
arrested, he was not simply unconsciously reacting but was instead trying to go around the
officer, trying to bite the officer, trying to pull from the officer, and threatening the
officer. R. 392-393. They heard that he further resisted arrest by spitting multiple times
22
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on the officer's car, and that the spitting was non-accidental and that Mr. Hillman said
"How do you like that?" to the officers while spitting on the car. R. 395-396. The jury
also heard audio and saw video of Mr. Hillman's interactions with the guards and
officers. R. 344-345, 350-351, 398-399.
In addition to the evidence supporting Mr. Hillman's culpable mental state, the
jury also heard substantial evidence arguably related to mental illness. The jury heard
testimony that Mr. Hillman was acting aggressive and "peculiar," motioning and dancing
in an "odd" way, and making en-atic movements. R. 341-342, 371. They heard that he
"did not seem to be himself," that he "was very disoriented, ve1y confused," and that he
was "very belligerent, very wild, very sporadic." R. 347, 352. They heard that he was
aggressive and acting strangely, and that he was not acting nonnally. R. 406-407, 427428. They heard audio and video of the interactions that caused the State's witnesses to
so testify. R. 344-345, 350-351, 398-399.
The jmy members heard quite a bit of evidence about Mr. Hillman's mental state,
demeanor, and behavior. They saw video of the exact behavior that was alleged to be
criminal in this case. They had plenty of infonnation to make their own detennination
about whether Mr. Hillman would have been able to, and whether he did, have the
requisite mental state for conviction. The brief potential testimony of one or both nonexpert officers, that in their opinion Mr. Hillman may have been suffering from mental
illness that day, beyond a reasonable doubt would not have changed the verdict. The
jurors had plenty of evidence about that issue to make their own detennination. Because
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the error was hannless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should affirm the district
~

court's ruling.

CONCLUSION
The district court's ruling on the State's motion in limine was both narrow and
correct. The district comijudge's ruling was correct under the Utah Rules of Evidence,
and Mr. Hillman's rights do not justify a deviation from those mies in this case. Mr.
Hillman also did not preserve this issue by sufficiently arguing it before the district comi
judge. This Court should affinn the district comi's ruling on the State's motion in limine,
and should affirn1 Mr. Hillman's conviction by a jury.
Respectfully submitted on January 12, 2018.

~

BRANDON E. SIMMONS

Deputy District Attorney

Counsel for Appellee
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1

know and we'd be glad to get you a break here.

2

to have witnesses ready and instructions, anything that

3

we need, so that we're not having the jury wait.

4

think that's the primary things that I wanted to share

5

with you, and, you know, if there are other issues that

6

we need to raise, I'd be glad to take those up as well.
MR. SIMMONS:

7

The

Important

And I

Judge, the state's

8

motion in 1imine, there's some connnentary by some of the

9

state's witnesses that the defendant might have a mental

10

illness.

11

and would request an order that the -- well, that neither

12

party e1icit testimony or ask questions about the

13

defendant's mental i11ness absent a showing first that --

14

that any mental illness he may have has a bearing on his

15

intent on the mens rhea element to the crime.

16

17
18

I'm not going to elicit any of that testimony,

THE COURT:

Okay.

Any thoughts on mental

illness?
MR. GARCIA:

And, Your Honor, in regards to

19

the mental i11ness, we won't ask a specific diagnosis or

20

anything like that, but I think i t just paints a whole

21

picture as to what occurred.

22

entitled to know exactly what was going on.

23

acting normal, 1ike normal people would be, so I think

24

any request that would try to elicit that to show just to

25

paint the complete picture of what was going on that day.

I think the jury is
He was not

5
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1

~

And Judge, I don't have -- I

2

certainly have no objections to questions about how the

3

defendant was acting, and that's my case as well.

4

the limitation I'm requesting would be request --

5

questions about whether he seemed -- whether he seemed

6

mentally ill, whether he seemed not all there, questions

7

along those lines.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SIMMONS:

10

Gj)

MR. SIMMONS:

My --

Mm-hmm.

Specific behaviors, no

objection.

11

THE COURT:

Yeah.

12

MS. MOONEY:

Your Honor, I think that we have

13

a right to humanize our client.

14

from mental illness.

15

mental health episode.

16

the jury just very briefly that he does suffer from

17

mental illness in my opening as just kind of introducing

18

who my client is to the jury.

19

Our client does suffer

This whole incident resulted from a
So, I did intend to mention to

I did also intend to ask the officer if,

20

based on his training and experience, working with

21

mentally ill populations, if he believed that my client

22

was suffering from a mental health episode at the time

23

that he encountered him, and that was going to be the

24

extent of my questioning.

25

MR. SIMMONS:

And Judge, I have no mental
6
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1

health professionals who are qualified to testify about

2

that sort of thing, who are qualified to make appropriate

3

opinions that the jury couldn't simply make from hearing

4

the testimony and watching video today.

5

mention in the opening, I'm not presenting any evidence

6

of -- that the defendant is mentally ill, and so unless

7

the defendant has -- unless the defense is going to

~

As far as a

(ii)

8

present evidence, I don't think that's appropriate in

9

opening.

10

MS. MOONEY:

And Judge, I would just say,

11

with the video that the state will be showing, it's

12

obvious that he's mentally ill.

13

that he is having a mental health episode.

14

THE COURT:

Common sense tells you

Yeah, and I guess the question I

15

have is how it's admitted.

16

he's the one person that could say, this is the diagnosis

17

I have, and this is the illness that I have.

18

know, I'm more inclined to hear that than I am have a

19

untrained police officer talk about whether or not

20

somebody's mentally ill.

21

And if he's not testifying,

And, you

I think that it's important that the whole

22

story gets out so his conduct, whether i t is appropriate

23

or inappropriate, is that you're able to do it.

24

think that -- that having somebody diagnose mental

25

illness without having a healthcare provider to do so,

But I

7
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1

I'm reluctant to allow you to do that.

2

MS. MOONEY:

Okay.

Will Your Honor allow me to at

3

least, in talking about who my client is to the jury in

4

opening, inform them that he has mental illness?

5

THE COURT:

Yeah, I mean, tell me what you --

6

I want to make sure that comes up in the trial as opposed

7

to being gratuitous.

MS. MOONEY:

8
9

I mean, is there something that
I think it's going to be

obvious.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. SIMMONS:

Okay.
Judge, I would object, and I

12

don't think anybody in the room is a -- I mean, we think

13

a lot of people are mentally ill, but unless it's in the

14

DSM5 and a mental health professional diagnoses someone,

15

they are not, in fact, mentally ill.

16

THE COURT:

Here's what I'd like to do, is

17

you can describe conduct.

18

diagnosis that is

19

then I'm going to do it.

20

limit it to conduct as what it is, and then let the jury

21

make their own determination with regard to that.

that comes in as part of the record,

22

MS. MOONEY:

23

THE COURT:

24

25

And if, in fact, there is a

But in your opening, let's

Okay?

Okay.
Okay.

Good.

Okay.

Any other

items that we need -MR. GARCIA:

Yes, Your Honor.

On some of the
8
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Did he tell you he had ID on him?

3

A.

I believe he said he did not.

4

Q.

At that point, when you were searching him,

5

if he had wanted to stop you from getting his ID, would

6

he have been able to?

7
8
9

10

A.

It's hard to say, I don't really want to

speculate.

Q.

Did any other officers have hands on him at

that point?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

In your work, do you

13

MR. SIMMONS:

14

THE COURT:

15

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).

16

MR. SIMMONS:

May we approach?
You may.

I want to ask him whether i t

17

seemed to him that Mr. Hil1man was having a mental health

18

episode.

19

make sure I'm not -- that wouldn't be a violation of the

20

Court's ruling.

I think we've opened that door, but I want to

21

MS. MOONEY:

22

THE COURT:

I wouldn't object.
My sense is that we have not.

I

23

mean, we've talked about his behavior, but I think when

24

you use the -- the modifier of mental, i t puts i t into a

25

different category, so I think that's inconsistent with

229
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1

what we had talked about previously

2

MR. SIMMONS:

3

That it's inconsistent, so I

shoul.d not?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SIMMONS:

You should not.
Okay.

(End of sidebar).

6
7

MR. SIMMONS :

8

THE COURT:

9

Anything else, Ms. Mooney?

10

MS. MOONEY:

Nothing further.
Thank you.

Briefly, Your Honor.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

11

12

BY MS. MOONEY:

13

Q.

14

this incident?

15

A.

Yes, I did.

16

Q.

Did you write i t on the very same day?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And you did write in that report that Mr.

Sir, you wrote a pol.ice report with regard to

19

Silva had stated that he had been spat on anywhere

20

between one to three times in the face?

21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

Did you write that in your report?

23

A.

I think so.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

And with regard to when Mr. Hill.man

was spitting on your vehicle, he was being hel.d against
230
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Jj,

Elements of Propelling a Bodily Substance (with Contact to the Face)
The Defendant is charged with committing Propelling a Bodily Substance (with Contact
to the Face) on or about August 16, 2016. You cannot convict the Defendant of this
offense unless, based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
following elements:
1. On or about August 16, 2016,
2. In Salt Lake County, Utah,
3. The defendant, ADAM HILLMAN,
4. Intentionally OR knowingly,

5. Propelled a bodily substance (his saliva) at another person, and
6. The substance came in contact with any portion of the other person's face.

After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that
each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant NOT GUILTY.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

zq

Elements of Interference with Arresting Officer
The Defendant is charged with committing Interference with Arresting Officer on or
about August 16, 2016. You cannot convict the Defendant of this offense unless, based
on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1.

On or about August 16, 2016,

2.

In Salt Lake County, Utah,

3.

The defendant, ADAM HILLMAN;

4.

Had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge,
that a law enforcement officer was seeking to lawfully arrest or detain him,

5.

And knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly interfered with arrest or detention by:
(a) refusing to perform any act necessary to effect the arrest of detention that was
required by lawful order of a law enforcement officer involved in that arrest or
detention; OR
(b) refusing to refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest or
detention.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that

each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant NOT GUILTY.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

30

Elements of Failure to Disclose Identity
The Defendant is charged with committing Failure to Disclose Identity on or about
August 16, 2016. You cannot convict the Defendant of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1.

On or about August 16, 2016,

2.

In Salt Lake County, Utah,

3.

The defendant, ADAM HILLMAN,

4.

Intentionally or knowingly or recklessly,

5.

Failed to disclose his name to a law enforcement officer,

6.

When he was subject to a lawful stop by a law enforcement officer and an officer

~

demanded that he disclose his name.

After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that
each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant NOT GUILTY.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ____3_"_/_ _
Intent

A person acts "intentionally" when his conscious objective is to:
1. engage in certain conduct; or
2. cause a certain result.

A person acts "knowingly" when the person:
1. is aware of the nature ofhis conduct; or
2. is aware of the particular circumstances surrounding his conduct; or
3. is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause a particular result.

A person acts "recklessly" when he is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that:
1. certain circwnstances exist relating to his conduct, but he consciously disregards
the risk and acts anyway; or
2. his conduct will cause a particular result, but he consciously disregards the risk and
acts anyway.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a
gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation.

"Conduct" means either an act or an omission.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
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Inferring the Required Mental State
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted with a particular mental state.
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proved directly,
because no one can tell what another person is thinking.
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding facts and
circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what the defendant did,
and any other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's mind.

~
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ADDENDUM2
Important Statutes and Rules
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 .................................................................................... 1
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5-102.9 ................................................................................. 3
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301.5 ................................................................................. 4
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 .................................................................................... 5

Utah R. Evid. 401 ....................................................................................................... 6
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Utah R. Evid. 403 ....................................................................................................... 6
Utah R. Evid. 602 ....................................................................................................... 7
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76-2-305 Mental illness -- Use as a defense -- Influence of alcohol or other substance
voluntarily consumed -- Definition.
(1)
(a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged.
(b) Mental illness is not otheiwise a defense, but may be evidence in mitigation of
the penalty in a capital felony under Section 76-3-207 and may be evidence of
special mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or attempted
criminal homicide offense under Section 76-5-205.5.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as "insanity" and
"diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who asserts a defense of insanity or diminished mental capacity, and who is
under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol, controlled
substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not excused
from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance
caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness.
(4) As used in this section:
(a) "Intellectual disability" means a significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and
manifested prior to age 22.

1
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(b)

(i) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that substantially
impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A
mental defect may be a congenital condition, the result of injury, or a
residual effect of a physical or mental disease and includes, but is not
limited to, intellectual disability.
(ii) "Mental illness" does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by
repeated criminal conduct.

Amended by Chapter 115, 2016 General Session

2
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76-5-102.9 Propelling a bodily substance -- Penalties.
( 1) As used in this section, a listed substance or material is:
(a) saliva, blood, urine, or fecal material;
(b) an infectious agent as defined in Section 26-6-2 of a material that carries an
infectious agent; or
(c) vomit or a material that carries vomit.
(2) Any person who knowingly or intentionally throws or otherwise propels any bodily
substance or material listed under Subsection ( 1) at another person is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor, except as provided in Subsection (3).
(3) A violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor if the substance or material
propelled is listed in Subsection ( 1), and:
~

(a) if the substance is the person's saliva, the person knows he or she is infected
with HIV, hepatitis B, or hepatitis C; or
(b) the substance or material comes into contact with any portion of the other
person's face, including the eyes or mouth, or comes into contact with any open
wound on the other person's body.
(4) If an offense committed under this section amounts to an offense subject to a greater
penalty under another provision of state law than under this section, this section
does not prohibit prosecution and sentencing for the more serious offense.

Enacted by Chapter 153, 2013 General Session
~
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76-8-301.5 Failure to disclose identity.

(1) A person is guilty of failure to disclose identity if during the period of time that the
person is lawfully subjected to a stop as described in Section 77-7-15:
(a) a peace officer demands that the person disclose the person's name;
(b) the demand described in Subsection (l)(a) is reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop;
(c) the disclosure of the person's name by the person does not present a reasonable
danger of self-incrimination in the commission of a crime; and
(d) the person fails to disclose the person's name.
(2) Failure to disclose identity is a class B misdemeanor.

Enacted by Chapter 293, 2008 General Session

~

4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

76-8-305 Interference with peace officer. 1
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or

4t;

(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act
that would impede from performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
~

Amended by Chapter 274, 1990 General Session

This statute was amended in 2017, with the new version taking effect on May 9, 2017.
The version listed here is the previous version, which was in effect at the time of the
crime and at the time of the jury trial.
1

5
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Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
Gj

•

the United States Constitution;

•

the Utah Constitution;

•

a statute; or

•

rules applicable in courts of this state.

Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

Rule 403.

Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time,

or Other Reasons
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.

6
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Rule 602. Need for Personal Knowledge
A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may consist of the witness's own testimony. This rule does not apply to a
witness's expert testimony under Rule 703.

~

Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited
to one that is:
(a)

rationally based on the witness's perception;

(b)

helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in
issue; and

(c)

not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Rule 702.

7
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Rule 702. Testimony by Experts

(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods
that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,

(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
@

(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c)
@

The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying
principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant
expert community.

8
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ADDENDUM3
Minutes for Jury Trial (R. 141-143)
Minutes for Sentence, Judgment, Commitment (R. 151-153)
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

MINUTES

STATE OF UTAH,

AMENDED: JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: 161908929 MO

ADAM ROBERTS HILLMAN,

Judge:

ROYAL I HANSEN

Date:

January 11, 2017

Defendant.

~

Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

PRESENT
Clerk:

lynettm

Prosecutor: SIMMONS, BRANDON E
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney{s}: GARCIA, SERGIO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 24, 1975
Sheriff Office#: 222459
Audio
Tape Number:

W49

Tape Count: 830-605
~

CHARGES
1. PROPELLING A BODILY SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 01/11/2017 Guilty

2. INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 01/11/2017 Guilty

3. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IDENTITY - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 01/11/2017 Guilty

4. CRIMINAL TRESPASS KNOWING ENTRY UNLAWFUL - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

~

- Disposition: 01/11/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi

TRIAL

832--Count 4 is dismissed. Motions in Limie heard and argued, Court rules as read on

Printed:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
01/11/17 18:10:35 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00141
Page 1 of 3

Case No: 161908929 Date:

Jan 11, 2017

the record.
Exclusionary Rule
935-Jury panel sworn in
1133-Jury panel chose and sworn in
1137- Recess
1151-Court resumes, preliminary jury instructions read
1202-States opening statement
1204-Defense opening statement
1210-Recess
112-Court resumes,

jury instructions reviewed and further argument as to the use of

video
138-States witness Christian Silva S&E
205-Cross
217-Redirect
218-Recross
219-States witness Jason Brown S&E
225-Cross
235-Redirect
256-Court resumes, Defense Motion to Exclude evidence is granted
300-States witness Cody Wilkes S&E
319-Cross
332-Redirect
338-Recross
340-Recess
350-Court resumes with States witness Clayton Fox S&E
357-Cross
State and Defense rests
400-Read further Jury Instructions
417-States Closing Statement
431-Defense Closing Statement
448-States Rebuttal
458-Bailiff sworn and deliberations begin
501-Defense Directive Verdict as to count 1 and 2 heard. Court finds there is evidence
and will proceed to the jurors.
506-Recess
549-Court Resumes deliberation completed
553-Verdict Read

'i)

Defendant to Report to AP&P for a PSR and set for Sentencing
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Case No: 161908929 Date:

Jan 11, 2017

Court Orders Defendant to remain in Custody with $10,000 Cash Only Bail

SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 03/03/2017
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: FOURTH FLOOR-W49
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UT

84114-1860

Before Judge: ROYAL I HANSEN

CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail.
Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and
services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior
to the hearing.

For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128.

The general

information phone number is (801)238-7300.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
At the
Dated: March 03, 2017
03:17:01 PM
Isl ROYAF

~.~f¢Jfi~~!il=--~

fJf~~~\

q_~~:~~:~/

Distric\

by

Isl

JONATltA?~i~if'
District Co;rt~ci;rk

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

@

@

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
ADAM ROBERTS HILLMAN,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Case No: 161908929 MO
Judge:
ROYAL I HANSEN
Date:
March 3, 2017

PRESENT
Clerk:
jonathae
Prosecutor: VEDEJS, MORGAN M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARCIA, SERGIO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 24, 1975
Sheriff Office#: 222459
Audio
Tape Count: 11:55
Tape Number:
N44

@

@

CHARGES
1. PROPELLING A BODILY SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/11/2017 Guilty
2. INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/11/2017 Guilty
3. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IDENTITY - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/11/2017 Guilty
4. CRIMINAL TRESPASS KNOWING ENTRY UNLAWFUL - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/11/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of PROPELLING A BODILY SUBSTANCE a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER a Class B
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Case No: 161908929 Date:

Mar 03, 2017

Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day{s)

The total time

suspended for this charge is 180 day{s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IDENTITY a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)

The total time

suspended for this charge is 180 day{s).
SENTENCE FINE
Charge# 1

Fine: $4625.00
Suspended: $4625.00
Surcharge: $
Fine: $1850.00

Charge# 2

(&;

Suspended: $1850.00
Surcharge: $
Charge# 3

Fine: $1850.00
Suspended: $1850.00
Surcharge: $
Total Fine: $8325.00

Total Suspended: $8325.00
Total Surcharge: $0
Total Principal Due: $0
Plus Interest
Restitution

Amount: $855.00 Plus Interest

Pay in behalf of: SLC ROAD HOME

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole.
Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any recommended
treatment.
Obtain a mental health evaluation and successfully complete any recommended treatment.
Defendant is trespassed from the Road Home and Pioneer Park.
Defendant is to be screened by AP&P's Treatment and Resource Center {TRC) and complete
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Case No: 161908929 Date:

Mar 03, 2017

any recommended programming/treatment as directed.
Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by probation agency.
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor associate with any
persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol or illegal drugs.
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed
illegally.
Submit to drug testing.
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the request of any law
enforcement officer.
Defendant is to take medications as prescribed.
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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